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Abstract
The biography and historiography of Galois abound with counterfactual imaginations of how the course of mathematics would have been altered, had he not
died so young. In the little known short story “The Day Without Evening,” published in 1924, the Jewish-Austrian writer Leo Perutz essentially reiterates the
usual narrative of the events leading to Galois’ death, masked only by changing the name of the protagonist to Durval and transposing the setting to the
Vienna of the beginning of the 20th century. But he is also wary of such counterfactual imaginations. This can be understood in the context of Augustine’s
theology, alluded to in the title of the story, which leads to an understanding
of Perutz’s reasoning on the different temporal order of artistic, scientific, and
divine creations.
The year 2011 was a ‘Galois-Year.’ We commemorated the 200th birthday
of not only the misunderstood hero of modern algebra, but also the romantic
revolutionary, the victim of a political conspiracy, and the unhappy lover
who, in 1832 at the age of only 20, lost his life in a duel. As Lillian R. Lieber
writes in Galois and the Theory of Groups: A Bright Star in Mathesis, a
book illustrated by her husband Hugh Gray Lieber, a century after Galois’
early death:
Galois died,
Just one hundred years ago,
Before he reached the age of
Twenty-one !
In his short and tragic life
He developed
Journal of Humanistic Mathematics

Vol 2, No 1, January 2012

Andrea Albrecht

3

This branch of mathematics,
Which is of the greatest importance
To-day.
He is ranked among the
Twenty-five greatest mathematicians
That EVER lived. [...]
He was ‘framed’
To fight a duel
In which he was killed.
Peace to his spirit.[15]
Not only literary writers like the Liebers, but also biographers1 and scientists such as Eric Temple Bell and Leopold Infeld2 contributed to the legend surrounding Galois’ short life and his sudden and tragic death. It was
only recently that historians of mathematics began to revise, from a historical standpoint, Galois’ dramatically embellished popular image, propagated
since the turn of the century. Yet this is not the place to discuss in detail
such revisions.3 Here, we shall consider an early fictional text that takes
Galois’ story as its subject and examines it through a literary-aesthetic lens.
I refer to a short story, barely spanning ten pages, written by the JewishAustrian author Leo Perutz (1882–1957): Der Tag ohne Abend (The Day
Without Evening). The author not only tells a “story,” but also, in the
story’s veiled, implicit form, critically comments on elements of the Galois
legend in circulation in the early 20th century.
Leo Perutz was born in Prague, studied mathematics and history in Vienna, and first worked as an actuary. The time of the First World War, during
which he was gravely wounded, saw Perutz’s first literary successes: the novels Die dritte Kugel (The Third Bullet) (1915) and Das Mangobaumwunder.
Eine unglaubwürdige Geschichte (The Mango Tree Miracle: An Unbelievable
Story) (1916, co-authored with Paul Frank). The success continued after the
war, as he published a series of novels and short stories, such as Der Marques
de Bolibar (The Marquis of Bolibar) (1920), the bestseller Der Meister des
Jüngsten Tages (The Master of the Day of Judgment) (1923) and Wohin
1

See for instance [9, 16].
The standard references are [5, 13]. For a recent popular account of Galois’ life, also
see [1].
3
We refer the reader interested in this thread to [7, 10, 23].
2
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rollst du, Äpfelchen... (Little Apple) (1928). The death of his wife in 1928
threw Perutz into crisis. In 1934 he remarried, but was soon forced to flee
from the National Socialists into a life in exile that would eventually lead him
to Tel Aviv. He returned to Austria in 1950 and took up residence in Bad
Ischl. But he encountered serious difficulties reinvigorating his literary career that had flourished before the Second World War. In 1953, he published
the novel By Night under the Stone Bridge, and the novel Leonardo’s Judas
(1959) was released posthumously, after his death in 1957. All but forgotten
by his readers, Perutz was only recently rediscovered in literature departments during the early 1980s, primarily through the works of Hans-Harald
Müller and Lutz Danneberg.
The Day Without Evening belongs to a collection of texts published in
1930 under the title Herr, erbarme dich meiner (Lord, have mercy upon me).
According to Müller’s reading of Perutz’s diaries [19], Perutz evidently wrote
the short story in a sort of “furor” within five days in November 1924.4 This
furor is mirrored by the story’s subject matter: a short but intense burst of
mathematical creativity in the life of Georges Durval, the story’s protagonist, who stands in as Perutz’s Galois-figure. Although Perutz only covertly
alludes to the story’s real subject (the Galois legend), although he displaces
events by almost a century to 1912, although he moves them from Paris to
Vienna, and although Perutz’s Galois-figure is neither a born revolutionary
nor a born mathematician, the story’s historical core is evident to readers
reasonably familiar with the history of mathematics and the life story of
Évariste Galois.5 Critical readers of the text need to keep an eye on the historical background, but they also need to pay attention to a second significant
context: the writings of Saint Augustine which provided Perutz with the title
of his story. “The day without evening” refers to Augustine’s dies septimus
sine vespera and his interpretation of Genesis. As I will argue in the following interpretation, the story of Perutz transforms the references to the Galois
legend and Augustinian theology into a reflection that begins by questioning
the sense (or nonsense) of counterfactual imaginations in historical reasoning
and that ends in the determination of the boundaries of human and divine
creation and knowledge. Perutz’s fictional, meta-biographical commentary
4

The story was first published in Hamburger Nachrichten 134 (1925), Numbers 106
and 107. For further information about the history of the publication see [20, page 176f].
5
The historical context of the text is noticed and evaluated by [8, page 31]. See also
[18, page 24f] and [27].
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on Galois thus evolves into a fictional, philosophical commentary on the human condition.
I start with an overview of the plot of Perutz’s story (§1), comment
on his turn against counterfactual imaginations in fictional and historical
writing (§2), continue with an explanation of Augustine’s theology (§3) and
finish with an argument that combines both contexts, the historical and
the theological, with Perutz’s reasoning on the different temporal orders of
artistic, scientific, and divine creation (§4).
1.
With a chronologically narrated plot, divided in the first edition visually
by asterisks into seven parts, the story’s relatively simple structure can be
quickly summarized: As the narrator reports in the story’s first, expository
section, Georges Durval is a dandy reminiscent of Pushkin’s Eugen Onegin,
who dilettantishly and unproductively pursues a multitude of interests, doing
a bit of mathematics on the side. However, he can sustain his lifestyle only
until the moment when, as the narrator declares full of foreboding at the end
of the exposition, “Georges Durval’s fate and predestination remembered
him” [21].
The anticipated caesura occurs on the evening of March 14, 1912 and
marks a turning point in Durval’s life: because of an inane fight, in which
a fellow restaurant guest insults him [21, page 163], Durval is challenged to
a duel. While the duel is postponed for a few weeks, he is grasped by a
“peculiar disquiet” [21, page 164] and begins to busy himself more intensely
with mathematics. His mathematical studies soon consume him completely,
breaking off his former connections with society. Durval makes only a single
visit to his mother’s nurse, otherwise devoting all of his time to mathematics.
The obsessive mathematical activity even continues when his seconds arrive
on the morning of the duel, April 25, 1912. Likewise, during the preparations directly preceding the duel – the ride to the designated location of the
shooting, the attempt at reconciliation, and the last instructions – Durval
continues to work on his mathematical problems. Eventually both duelists
shoot, and the narrator laconically states: “This day had no evening” [21,
page 168], thus announcing Durval’s death. In the story’s last section, the
narrator provides a meta-commentary which hints, on the one hand, at the
aftermath, the posthumous publication of Durval’s works by an “academic
society” and, on the other hand, at a possible interpretation of the story:
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The story of George Durval had to be told. Sometimes, it seems
to me as if it would offer insight into the economy of world events.
It is debatable, whether the greats of science, art, or literature –
such as Pushkin, Lassalle, or Lord Byron – who died young, would
have added just one more line to their works, had death passed
them by. Maybe fate only calls upon those who have nothing
more to give, who, in the end, are finished, empty, and burned
out [21, pages 168f].
These reflections are remarkable for a number of reasons. The narrator uses them to interrupt abruptly the story’s narration, to reveal himself
suddenly as a first person narrator, and to all but usurp the story for his
own interpretation. Indeed, other stories by Perutz also contain interpretive
commentaries added after the fact. But what is afoot here is not simply
the exposure of the story’s fictive and constructed character; nor is it just
a reference to the historical-philosophical exemplarity of the story’s subject
matter; nor is it the valorization of the Durval/Galois plot as a significant instance of the “economy of world events.” Rather, through the specific case of
Durval/Galois, Perutz calls into question and tentatively revises the practice
of counterfactual scenarios,6 the postulation of which the life stories of “the
greats of science, art, or literature . . . who died young” continually seem to
invite.
2.
What if Galois had not died so young? Counterfactual imaginations of
this kind are such a timely figure of thought in the critical literature surrounding Galois that Perutz’s challenge to them demands further discussion.
By 1846 the mathematician Joseph Liouville stated that, had it never come
to the “calamitous duel,” Galois would have “expanded the mathematical
sciences in ways that would have aroused great interest” [16, page 87]. Felix Klein makes a similar postulation in his Lectures on the Development of
Mathematics in the 19th Century (1926/1927) (although the lectures were
first published posthumously, Klein was known to mull upon this idea frequently before his death.) As Klein writes, we can assume:
6

Counterfactual narratives are currently of great interest to narratologists, historians,
and philosophers of science, see for example [6].
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that Galois would have continued on the prescribed path to new
successes, and would have given the world insights unimaginable
even today, if his passionate temperament had not prepared for
him such an early end [14, page 92].
In a tenor not untypical for mathematicians, Liouville and Klein clearly
rely on an assumption of the inexhaustibility of mathematics and the linearity
and determinate nature of the progression of mathematical knowledge. The
cumulative growth of knowledge can thus be slightly hindered by happenstance singular events, such as Galois’ early death, but it cannot be stopped.
Acting on these assumptions, counterfactual imaginations seem to be reasonable although they do not contribute anything new to the historical account.
Categorically skeptical of the point of counterfactual imaginations regarding Galois’ not-lived life is the historian of science George Sarton. In
his melancholy portrait of Galois from 1921, Sarton ultimately rejects such
postulations as pointless. Yet, he still finds a positive aspect in this rejection,
namely the greatness and purity of Galois’ immortality that resides in the
brevity of his life:
What would not Galois have given us, if he had been granted six
more such years at the climax of his life? But it is futile to ask
such questions. [...] does it really matter? A few years more or
less, a little more or less suffering .... Life is such a short drive
altogether. Galois has accomplished his task and very few men
will ever accomplish more. He has conquered the purest kind of
immortality [24, pages 363 and 365].
Thus, if Perutz allows his Durval/Galois to slip into the ranks of the
“greats who died young” – who provide the creators of biographical and
scientific-historical legends welcome occasion for counterfactual imaginations
of the distinct inexhaustible potential of their hero – and simultaneously
questions this practice within the framework of his story, then he agrees
to a certain extent with Sarton’s position. Whereas Perutz’s rejection of
counterfactual imaginations is achieved through irony within a fictional text
and thus comes from the perspective of a writer who possesses the poetic
license to fictionalize events, Galois’ biographers (Sarton included) are supposed, as the standards of their discipline dictate, to mistrust counterfactual
scenarios. Therefore, Perutz imitates in his fictional text biographical, historical narratives supposedly based on facts in order to reveal the premises
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that are particularly manifest in counterfactual postulations. Accordingly,
Perutz’s text forms a fictional, meta-biographical commentary on counterfactual imaginations in biographical and historical writing.
3.
The secondary literature on Perutz has repeatedly stressed that Perutz’s
texts express “a determinate and fatalistic perspective on history”, according
to which “coincidence and necessity” concur in a manner that seems absurd to
the human observer [26, page 147]. In reference to Perutz’s historical novels,
Michael Mandelartz for instance speaks of a “divine logic of destruction”
and of a “violence of history,” at the mercy of which, according to Perutz’s
perspective of history, the individual stands [17, pages 194 and 87].
In The Day Without Evening these generally valid observations receive a
peculiar treatment connected, on the one hand, with mathematical-historical
references to Galois and, on the other hand, with a specific reflection on
time and history. In addition, Perutz’s short story contains a theological
subtext: Augustine’s theology of creation and doctrine of predestination.
Perutz takes from Augustine not only the story’s title, but also a framework
for the story’s narrative and philosophical construction as well as its formal,
seven-sectioned shape. At least three theological aspects are relevant here
and shall be discussed in the following: first, Augustine’s program for the
individual’s contemplative path to God, second, his interpretation of genesis
and, third, his philosophic concept of oikonomia.
What the narrator identifies as the intervention of Georges Durval’s fate
and “predestination” is that which Durval himself experiences as an inner
drive to which he completely falls victim. After his interest for mathematical
problems has been piqued, he senses excitement and a “peculiar disquiet . . .
whose source was not to be found in his thoughts about the duel that stood
before him.” He feels as if he was “excited by a daemon” [21, pages 164f] –
“la fureur des Mathématiques le domine”, as a teacher of Galois once said [9,
page 208] – and finds temporary peace and a type of fulfillment solely in his
mathematical work. Certainly, mathematical questions played a role in his
life before the duel: Durval sometimes entertained ideas during chess games,
as the narrator informs us, “which led him to the realm of higher mathematics” [21, page 161]; he had thought about “the rectification of isothermic
families of curves” through the “expansion of Picard’s theorem” and contemplated “disproving Marxist economics through mathematical-analytic meth-
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ods of thought” [21, page 162]. The latter observation is not uninteresting,
especially in the context of the French and later, Anglo-American reception
of Galois: In contrast to the majority of Galois biographers, Perutz seems
disinterested in his political affiliation. He avoids alluding to Galois’ revolutionary past and even tends to turn Durval into a critic of the Left who
works on a “disproval” of Marxism via a theory of political economy founded
on mathematics. Perutz might have found a real world model for this approach, for instance, in the liberal Italian political economist Vilfredo Pareto.
Similarly, actuarial-mathematical criticisms of Marxism have found approval
in right-wing conservative circles. For instance, the mathematician Theodor
Vahlen expresses a similar standpoint in his speech The Worth and Essence
of Mathematics, held in 1923:
Not only is actuary mathematics a discipline of higher mathematics of great practical significance, but also remarkable progress
has been made in sociology to raise actuary mathematics from a
political to an exact science. We can hope that it is in this way
possible to expose once and for all the nonsense of Marxism and
show it for what it really is: a fairy tale for political children [29,
page 6].
Perutz is obviously not interested in a politicization of his protagonist. On
the contrary, the allusion to a mathematical refutation of Marxism shifts the
attention from Galois the revolutionary to Durval/Galois the mathematician
and his peculiar conditio humana. It is Durval’s fate to be a mathematician
and, as such, he involuntarily devotes the rest of the time that remains before
the duel to mathematics:
The evening was his time. Deep clarity came to him every evening
as the lamp burned, bringing with it insight into hidden connections. At such times he worked with quiet preponderance, his
eyes on the prize [21, pages 164f].
Perutz’s depiction of mathematical creativity is a variation of the widespread cliché of the socially isolated mathematician concentrated entirely on
his work, who forgets even the life-threatening situation in which he finds
himself. At the same time, Perutz also allows his protagonist to “mature,”
with clear echoes of Augustine’s idea of a successive coming-to-rest through
contemplative, intellectual exercise. As we can read in the Confessions, Augustine first had to overcome the excesses of his youth, the squandering and
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misuse of his “gift” (ingenium) on “follies” [4, page 18], on game and theater, in order finally to arrive on the path of contemplation that leads to inner
peace. In one of his commentaries on Genesis, De Genesi contra Manichaeos
libri Duo (ca. 389), Augustine compares and generalizes this process of individual maturation with the process of Creation. Accordingly, once belief has
been awoken in someone, he or she can successively divulge himself of the
sensory-corporal aspects of life in favor of a commitment to spiritual aspects
and, in this manner, move towards God [2].
We find something similar in the figure of Durval. While he has previously sought above all else amusement and adventure in sensual pleasure
and societal enjoyment, he now develops an awareness of the spiritual and
intellectual dimensions of life along with the interest in mathematics. Neither the offer of a game of bridge, nor the news of the marriage of “a young
girl, who had played a certain role in his life,” can distract him from the
state of mathematical contemplatio that consumes him every evening. For
Durval, the adventure he had previously sought in society seems to have,
after having been challenged to the duel, entirely lost any hint of excitement,
supplanted now by the spiritual adventures he finds in mathematics. Only
music – here again a typical element of the stereotype of the mathematician –
is able to accompany him into the realm of “singular points” of Cayley curves
and of the “theory of differential equations.” Only music can complete his
contemplative ascension into the realm of the spiritual:
Sometimes a violin sounded from the neighboring apartment, a
young girl who he did not know, practiced Tartini’s A-Major
sonata. And the sadness of this melody united with the mysteries
of mathematics to form a magical and fantastical world as full of
adventure as Klingsor’s garden [21, page 165].
Durval’s experience recalls not only the Klingsor fairytale from Novalis’
novel Heinrich from Ofterdingen (1802) and Richard Wagner’s Parsifal (1882),
but also Hermann Hesse’s novella Klingsor’s Last Summer (1919). With
similarities also to Van Gogh’s biography, Hesse’s story depicts the painter
Klingsor who, aware of his imminent death, experiences a final obsessive
phase of artistic production and finishes a self-portrait while living in almost
complete isolation. Hesse writes in the preface: “His works live forth, and
the legend of his life and of this last summer no less lives on in the circles of
his closest friends” [11, page 8].
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Yet Perutz does not expand upon these intertextual references. Nevertheless, like Hesse’s Klingsor, Durval also reaches his “goal.” He works on
his mathematical problems, literally, until his last breath: shortly before departing for the duel, he jots down “algebraic formulas” on the backside of
a “laundry bill,” uses a stop during the chauffeured car ride to write “long
mathematical expansion series on the marble top” of a café table [21, page
167], and even asks the duel officiary for “a little piece of paper” on which
he hopes to scribble down a few last ideas. The reference to legends surrounding Galois’ last night is unmistakable; Perutz’s depiction falls nothing
short of dramatics, as Durval, in comparison to Galois, actually never stops
calculating. The parallel narration of the ever-intensifying duel events and
the mathematical chains of thought, likewise rapidly approaching their conclusion, drives the short story to its climax:
The seconds measured the distance. Unconcerned with what was
happening around him, Georges Durval stood at the wooden wall
that marked off the dueling area and calculated. The duel officiary had loaded the pistols. . . . At this moment, Georges Durval
turned around. With the piece of paper in his hand he walked
towards Captain Drescovich [one of his seconds, A.A.]. His face
showed peace and complete indifference. He had brought his work
to an end [21, page 168].
With this action, Durval confirms from his own perspective the narrator’s
theory that quickly follows: “that fate only calls upon those people who
have nothing more to give, who, in the end, are finished, empty, and burned
out.” Durval evidently fulfilled the predetermined course ascribed to him by
fate through the solution of his mathematical problem, so that the feelings
of peace and complete indifference – which he feels despite the impending
duel and which contrast the prior societal upheaval and mathematical furor
– can be fully justified by the individual accomplishment of mathematical
creation. His increasing renunciation of sensuous and worldly concerns in
favor of mathematical contemplation finds here its ultimate end.
However, the chain of mathematical thought persists in Durval’s head.
Right after he feels the satisfaction to have finally found the solution, he
starts to think of a more elegant reformulation and to look forward to the
evening to dwell on this new mathematical idea:
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The formula can easily be divided into a real and an imaginary
part, Durval said to himself. There must be another, a more
elegant type of solution. Anyway, this evening, when I . . .
Two shots interrupt these thoughts, and the narrator contradicts his fallen
hero: “This day had no evening” [21, page 168].
Augustine’s theology of creation illuminates the punch line of the narrator’s laconic sentence, which confirms the death of Perutz’s protagonist and
lends the short story its title. In the thirteenth and last book of Confessions, Augustine arrives at a discussion of the meaning of the Sabbath, of
dies septimus sine vespera:
O Lord God, grant us peace, for Thou hast granted us all things,
the peace of repose, the peace of Thy Sabbath, the peace that
has no evening. For this gloriously beautiful order of things that
are very good will pass away when it has achieved its end: it will
have its morning and its evening.
But the seventh day is without evening. It has no sunset, for You
sanctified it that it may abide forever. After all Your works which
were very good, You rested on the seventh day – although You
made them with no interruption of Your repose. And likewise the
voice of Your Book tells us that we also, after our works – which
are only very good because You have granted us to accomplish
them – will rest in You in the Sabbath of life everlasting [4, pages
320f].
In the context of Augustine’s theology of creation, human works are only
creations of a second order, in that God’s spirit works through man. Humans
and human creations are, unlike God, subject to a temporal order; they have
“a beginning and end in time, a rising and setting, growth and decay, beauty
and defect. Thus they have their succession of morning and evening” [4, page
319]. Only God is timeless, eternal, and perfect: “But You, Lord, are ever in
action and ever at rest. You do not see in time, nor move in time, nor rest in
time” [4, page 321]. As long as he is still alive, man is separated from God’s
timeless, eternal peace. But, at the end of his days, he can find his peace in
God “on the Sabbath of eternal life.”
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4.
Through the unattributed quote from Augustine, Perutz calls upon the
theological ideas of creator and creation. The fatal shot rips Durval from
the temporal order and transfers him to his ‘day without evening.’ Since
he has successively become more at peace in the course of his mathematical
contemplation and since he has finally reached his goal through his growing mathematical concentration, Durval has made his scientific contribution
and finds ultimate peace – if one may say so – through divine intervention.
However, his creative work still remains incomplete and, in a certain sense,
incompletable. Indeed, Durval has “fulfilled the proportion allotted” to him,
but has, all told, only made a small and incomplete contribution to mathematical knowledge as a whole. The mathematical knowledge that remains
and progresses with time is, after Durval’s insights, anything but finished
– and is neither finishible nor completable. Yet the fundamental incompletability of scientific knowledge becomes clear to Durval in the moment
death arrives: there must still be “a more elegant type of solution” to the
mathematical problem he had just solved [21, page 168]. Perutz underscores
the impression of incompletability with a further hint regarding what Durval
will leave behind. The curators of Durval’s archive will never enjoy the complete Durvalian solution, because they are confronted with a “torso,” whose
missing parts are “scattered in the wind,” given over to chance:
But even when his work is available, collected in 10 volumes,
even then it will remain a torso. His last, final work will never
be found. It is distributed across the back of a laundry bill, the
top of a marble caf table, and a small sheet from a notebook,
scattered in the wind [21, page 169].
Incompleteness, incompletability, and the fundamental torso-like nature of
mathematical knowledge contrast here powerfully with the completion, selfsufficiency, and perfection of God. With this juxtaposition, Perutz negates
any attempt undertaken by the human genius and his creations that would
seek to approximate God and his Creation – a practice more than common
in the aesthetic and scientific cults of genius in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Paul Dupuy, Galois’ first biographer, finds consolation for his
hero’s early death in an allusion to the immortality of genius:
Du moins le tombeau ne l’a-t-il pas pris tout entier; les quelques
pages qu’il a laissées ont suffi pour que la patrie sache son nom: sa
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vraie patrie, la plus belle et la plus large de toutes, celle où fraternisent nécessairement, dans les conceptions rigoureuses et profondes des Mathématiques, tant de nobles intelligences dispersées
sur tous les points du monde. Si, comme il le disait, l’immortalité
n’est que la trace laissée dans la mémoire des hommes, il est assuré
de l’immortalité tant qu’il y aura des hommes: ignoré de la foule,
son nom est défendu contre l’oubli par l’admiration d’une élite;
c’est pour elle que j’ai écrit cette étude, en souhaitant d’ajouter à
l’admiration du génie quelque sympathie pour l’me ardente, pour
le coeur tourmenté et misérable, et de dresser enfin, à côté de
ce nom qui ne représentait que des idées, la figure vivante d’un
homme [9, page 252].7
Therefore, Galois’ death is not a ‘real’ death. For Dupuy, Galois by his
genius reaches a level of immortality in an afterlife of “intelligences” that will
further develop his ideas. George Sarton seems to make a similar assumption,
that the (imagined) infinite future of the progress of scientific knowledge
compensates for the finitude of individual existence:
To put it more concretely, when we are very thirsty a juicy orange is more precious to us than an orange tree. Yet when the
emergency has passed, we learn to value the tree more than any
one of its fruits; for each orange is an end in itself, while the tree
represents the innumerable oranges of the future. The fame of
Galois has a similar foundation; it is based upon the unlimited
future [24, page 364].
Galois’ “orange tree” thus seems to outlive Galois’ “juicy orange.” Perutz,
however, does not accept this consolatory theory of afterlife and he rejects
7

Translation: “At least the grave has not taken him entirely; the few pages he has left
have sufficed for the fatherland to know his name: his true fatherland, the most beautiful and largest of all, where so many noble minds, dispersed to all places of the world,
convene with their brothers in the rigorous and deep concepts of mathematics. If, as he
said, immortality is nothing but the trace left in the memories of men, he is sure of his
immortality as long as there are men. Ignored by the masses, it is the admiration of an
elite that defends his name against oblivion. It is for them that I have written this study,
wishing to add to the admiration of the genius some sympathy for the burning soul, for the
tormented and suffering heart, and, finally, to put next to this name, which stands only
for ideas, the living figure of a man.’ ’
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the idea of a secular, history of salvation propagated by science. George
Sarton claimed that “the history of science is the history of mankind’s unity,
of its sublime purpose, of its gradual redemption” [25, page i] and, through
this claim, Sarton expresses his conviction that scientific geniuses like Galois, while they are not equal to the Redeemer himself, function as an agent
of a secular process of redemption that is completed within the course of
time. Following Augustine, Perutz’s short story provides a refutation of the
equation of divine and earthly power. As long as the flow of time is not
brought to an end, “knowledge in time,” as Augustine writes, is bound to
the temporal order, such that an unbridgeable schism separates the progression of scientific knowledge, which seems to guarantee a temporalized form
of immortality, from God’s permanent being, which is enclosed into itself.
Any equation or convergence of God and genius, human and divine creation
is hence nothing less than a vain overestimation of human ability. In De
Trinitate, Augustine says equally apodictically that “a nature that is made
is always less than He who made it” [3, page 199]. Human knowledge is also
not to be compared to divine knowledge: “This knowledge is far unlike our
knowledge” [3, page 194].
The distance between humans and God is thus clearly marked. But Perutz seems to differentiate even within the realm of temporal, earthly being
by distinguishing between the works of science and the works of art – at least
from Durval’s perspective. To elaborate on this, we must go back to a rather
puzzling interlude in the story that hints at such a differentiation: It is only
once that Durval, for the “sole time,” interrupts his obsessive, mathematically creative phase and visits “his mother’s paralyzed nurse” [21, page 165].
He complains to her that he is “on the wrong path” with his mathematical
activities. And he goes as far as to defend the thesis that not mathematics, but instead “the study of music, the editing and publication” of Italian
Baroque music could have been “his life’s true assignment.”
Only in music would he have been sure to achieve something
positive, something lasting. That, with which he now concerns
himself, is just a worthless gimmick, an entertaining pastime perhaps, but certainly nothing more [21, page 166].
Durval has no choice. He is destined to be a mathematician, even if he momentarily considers this to be futile. Nevertheless, his counterfactual imagination deserves closer attention, for Durval does not, as the reader might
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expect, imagine himself being an artist instead of a mathematician, for example a musician or a composer who creates “something positive, something
lasting.” Durval rather ponders being a historian of music, who would afford
longevity and recognition to the already existent creations of Tartini, Correlli, Vitali, and Locatelli, from which “quite a bit still [lies] unnoticed in the
archives” [21, page 166]. Tending to and passing on others’ artistic works
seems to him to be of more value than his own mathematical creativity.
Considered within the Augustinian interpretive paradigm, a connection
arises here to Augustine’s early work De Musica (384-409). In it, Augustine
demonstrates the congruence of numbers with musical rhythms and justifies
in detail the ascension to God proceeding from a sensory to a spiritual perception of numbers and rhythms. While the numeri sensualis are corporally
perceived numbers that are transient and must be memorized, the numeri
rationis, the ‘numbers of reason,’ are eternal and unchangeable. The latter
belong to the truth hidden by God and protreptically remind the human
subject, when he or she hears them, to concentrate on spiritual and mental
perception.
Augustine thus connects music with memory. In this regard, Perutz’s
story shows something more essential than just the topical association of
music and mathematics. Like the academic society’s archival curators who
preserve Durval’s writings after his death, the musical historian is entrusted
to inscribe human artifacts into the cultural memory and to protect them
against oblivion. Had Joseph Liouville not taken upon himself to edit and
publish Galois’ unpublished papers, we would not have today Galois theory
– at least not with the same name. Likewise, without the history of music, there would be no, or only coincidental and rudimentary knowledge of
Tartini’s oeuvre. While Perutz does not develop this counterfactual consideration further, he does interweave a vanitas-motif into his text: In that last
sentence he explains how a small piece of paper containing Durval’s final
notes is “scattered in the wind.” This also alludes to the expression vanitas,
which is the translation of the Hebrew word häväl (wisp of wind) in the Latin
translation of the Bible. Both art and science necessitate continuation to not
perish with their creator. Their temporal existence entails that they must
be held contemporary through artificial means and with extensive, institutional expenditure, such as in the archival projects undertaken by academic
societies. In contrast to the artist or the scientist, God, of course, does not
depend on cultural memory. The timeless divine Being, his Creation, and
his Knowledge of his Creation are – to follow the Augustinian explanation –
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present in his perfection and autonomy. In this sense, Augustine asks in De
Trinitate:
What man, therefore, can comprehend that wisdom by which
God knows all things, and in such a way the what are called past
thing as are not past for Him, nor does He await the coming of
what are called future things as though they were absent, but
both past and future things are all present together with present
things [. . . ] What man, I say, comprehends that wisdom, that
foresight, and that knowledge, seeing that we are unable even
to comprehend our own? For we can perceive in some way or
other those things which are present either to our senses or to
our understanding, but we know those which are absent, and yet
had been present through our memory, insofar as we have not
forgotten them. We do not conjecture the past from the future,
but the future from the past, yet not with a sure knowledge [3,
pages 180f].
In conclusion, against this Augustinian background we gain a more precise
understanding of Perutz’s refutation of counterfactual imaginations and the
meta-fictional, interpretive hypothesis provided by his narrator. According
to the narrator’s interpretation, imagining the insights to which Galois could
have lead mathematics had he not died so young may still seem obvious, even
seductive. But it is as meaningless as a discussion of how Creation would
appear had God spent an eighth – or even a ninth, or a tenth – day creating
it. Drawing an analogy between human and divine Creation may, as such,
be acceptable for the individual, for Galois, Durval, or Tartini, insofar as his
or her creative process imitates the divine process of creation and ultimately
leads to a ‘day without evening.’ But the human – who strives for knowledge
in the temporal order and who depends on the facts of the past and their
arduous preservation for his future prospects – exceeds his own bounds if he
thinks against the facts and imagines alternative futures, transgressing the
order of time (cf. [12, 22, 28]). As Perutz exposes in his short story, neither
the contemporary nor the future “economy of world events” lies under human
control. And, in Augustinian theology, the expression oikonomia designates
precisely this fact: The doctrine of God’s action in the world. This action,
however, is experienced in the story as determinism, as Perutz exemplifies
through the figure of Durval. Durval has no choice, and after the fulfillment
of his mathematical task he is “finished, empty, and burned-out.”
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Following Augustine, knowledge of God’s being, the theologia, can be inferred theologically from the oikonomia, and therefore, humans are supposed
to gain access to God through the observation of worldly events. But for
Perutz, despite the ubiquitous theological allusions in his short story, it is
not a question of the propagation of a theological program, however it may
be conceived. On the contrary, he narrates a “story,” in which references
from the history of mathematics and theology are condensed and stylized
into philosophical reflection and a poetological punch line. In this context
the narrator refers metafictionally to his own story: “The story of George
Durval had to be told.” Consequently, even he is not free, but instead is subject, like his fictional figures, to a wide-reaching determinism – in this case,
the necessity of narration. As musicians and historians of music preserve
the work of Tartini, or mathematicians and learned archive curators preserve
the work of Durval, it is the predestination of the poet to preserve historical events from being forgotten or, at least, to render present that which is
forgotten through narration itself. Even if Durval’s last notes, “scattered in
the wind,” cannot be reconstructed and his never completed mathematical
insights cannot be imagined against the facts, then at least his story reminds
us that they are lost. And this is another reason why “the story of George
Durval had to be told.”
Acknowledgments: I thank Matthew Handelman for his help with the
translation of this paper.
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Stationen der Wirkung, ed. by Brigitte Forster and Hans-Harald Müller,
Vienna, Sonderzahl, pages 23–33.
[19] Müller, Hans-Harald (2007). Leo Perutz. Biographie, Vienna, Zsolnay,
pages 205–208.
[20] Müller, Hans-Harald, and Eckert, Britta (Eds.) (1989). Leo Perutz 1882–
1957: Eine Ausstellung der Deutschen Bibliothek, Frankfurt am Main
u.a., Zsolnay.
[21] Perutz, Leo (1985). “Der Tag ohne Abend”, in: Herr, erbarme dich
meiner, by Leo Perutz, Vienna, Zsolnay, pages 161–169.
[22] Richter, Gerhard (2005). Oikonomia. Der Gebrauch des Wortes oikonomia im Neuen Testament, bei den Kirchenvätern und in der theologischen Literatur bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte),
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